Key Takeaways
- Sabatini v. Knouse, No. SJC-13781 (Mass. May 19, 2026) expands liability and provides a means to sue individual perpetrators of sexual harassment;
- The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) reasoned that M.G. c. 214, § 1C (Section 1C) only incorporates terms expressly provided for under M.G. cc. 151B and 151C, leaving the standard of liability unresolved;
- Insurers may face challenges with indemnification, necessitating prompt individual exclusions.
Introduction
On May 19, 2026, the SJC issued a transformative decision on the issue of liability in Massachusetts. The Court concluded that Section 1C provides a sexual harassment victim with a cause of action directly against the individual perpetrator of harassment in the academic context. The ruling notably broadens the scope of liability, exposing a larger number of individuals to civil litigation. Significantly, the SJC reasoned that Section 1C expressly included certain provisions in G.L. cc. 151B and 151C and excluded all other provisions. In so ruling, the Court also raises a new question of law on the appropriate standard of liability.
The Case
In Sabatini, a laboratory director at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (Whitehead) and tenured professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) met a graduate student in 2012. The professor served as the student’s instructor, fellowship director, and mentor. An independent legal investigation revealed that the professor engaged in sexual relations with the graduate student and he resigned. Shortly thereafter, the professor filed an action against the graduate student and Whitehead for defamation, tortious interference, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful discrimination. The graduate student filed a counterclaim against the professor alleging, inter alia, sexual harassment under Section 1C. The Superior Court dismissed the counterclaim and held that Section 1C does not allow claims against individuals. An appeal timely followed and the SJC granted further appellate review limited to the issue of whether Section 1C permits claims against individuals, as opposed to educational institutions, for sexual harassment in an educational context.
Impact on Liability
The SJC’s ruling revealed a critical flaw under the existing statutory framework of Section 1C. Following the Court’s reasoning, Section 1C is silent on the standard of liability and only imputes provisions expressly provided for in the statute. Absent guidance from the SJC, whether Section 1C imposes a deliberate indifference or strict liability standard is uncertain.
Nevertheless, longstanding principles governing public entity liability strongly suggest that some institutional fault, notice, or legally sufficient connection between an academic institution’s conduct and the alleged injury remains necessary. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under Title IX, damages may not be recovered for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the district’s teachers unless an official of the school district, who at minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf, has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct. The Supreme Court recognized that holding a school district strictly liable for an employee’s hidden, unauthorized criminal acts would impose an unworkable and unintended financial burden on education. Unfortunately, the SJC has yet to adopt a similar view.
Impact on Insurance
The expanded liability under Section 1C carries severe, disruptive implications for the insurance and risk-underwriting markets serving academic institutions and homeowners. Policies have traditionally been priced and structured under the predictable standards established by Gebser and its progeny. In response, insurers may be forced to implement higher deductibles and enforce outright exclusions for sexual misconduct claims. The perpetrator is typically denied coverage under the employer’s insurance policy; however, a perpetrator may be able to seek a defense under the personal injury endorsement of a homeowner’s policy. If the victim publicly accuses the perpetrator, and the perpetrator files a countersuit for defamation, then then personal injury endorsement likely applies and affords coverage to the individual.
Recommendations
- Educational institutions must implement strict policies and advise faculty and staff on both the personal and institutional risks surrounding sexual harassment;
- Defense counsel should challenge improper applications of c. 151B and c. 151C to Section 1C and reject the imposition of strict liability on schools;
- Insurers should rewrite policies and include (i) an exclusion for employees found liable under Section 1C, (ii) a provision for subrogation against the individual perpetrator, or (iii) limit the personal injury endorsement in homeowner’s policies.
